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Abstract 
In this paper we propose an oligopolistic market model of pollution, where 
demand is not linear and firms are revenue maximizers. Additionally we assume 
that the rate of purification is very small tending to zero and that each firm 
accumulates a pollution share depending for example on firm’s size. The game 
ends up with Markov strategies employed by all firms. Our findings show that 
under conditions it is possible a marginal decrease on the total pollution stock to 
increase firms’ discounted revenues. A reallocation caused by a uniform decrease 
in all firms pollution, reorders the marginal change of the pollution stocks in 
reverse of the original order of the allowed pollution.  
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1.  Introduction 
In this study we present a dynamic model of polluting oligopolists, where firms 
compete α& la Cournot.  Former models of Cournot oligopolistic markets are static and 
with or without linear demand functions. The existing literature on such models of 
polluting oligopolists can be distinguished in two general categories, depending on the 
resulting strategies employed by the rivals. The first originates in Tsutsui and Mino 
(1990) who established non-linear rivals strategies in a linear quadratic setting and the 
second is the broad category that results in linear such strategies into the same 
dynamic setting (see Dockner and Long, 1993; Carlier, 2008). However all of the 
existing models focus on a linear demand function resulting in a linear quadratic 
differential game.  
Here, we consider a more general formulation of the demand function, which 
covers the above demand functions and the linearity of demand is a special case. The 
assumption about demand results in a non quadratic differential game. The usual 
assumptions in this class of pollution games is of quadratic utility functions and linear 
constraints depending both on the output of all firms and on the rate of the natural 
purification too. Specifically, we relax the last purification assumption, which means 
that the damage caused by pollution is permanent or the rate of purification is very 
small approaching zero, a fact that is verified for every kind of pollutants having very 
long life time.  
To that end we tight the assumption that pollution is accumulated by all firms in 
the industry. We assume that each firm accumulates its own pollution stock that is 
allowed by the regulator and the above variable size stock is dependent for example 
on the firm’s size. This assumption in our opinion is more flexible than the usual 
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accumulated pollution assumption and results in an easier manipulation by the 
regulator (government or organization) of the total industrial pollution. 
The proposed model relies on a very simple idea. Once a representative 
oligopolistic firm is endowed with its own allowed pollution stock and Markovian 
strategies together with the value function of the quantity produced, as a function of 
the pollution stock, is computed then it is easy for the regulator to manage the 
pollution allowance in such a way as to achieve lower total pollution together with 
higher revenues without taxes levying. Although it is expected that the more the 
firm’s revenues by higher production the more the firm’s own pollution, it is possible 
as further analysis reveals to have lower private pollution levels together with higher 
private revenues. In the rest of paper we explore the conditions under which the latter 
will be true. Applying a more general than linear demand function in which curvature 
plays the crucial role the conditions of optimality with respect to lower pollution are 
achieved. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 reviews the existing relative 
literature. Section 3 sets up the basic model of polluting oligopolists, while section 4 
presents the strategies of the Markov Perfect Nash Equilibrium (MPNE) and the value 
function of the oligopolists discounted revenues. Section 5 proposes policies that may 
be followed by a social planner in order to reduce industry’s pollution. The last 
section concludes the paper. 
2. Literature review 
A dynamic game is considered as a case of extensive game (Fudenberg and Tirole, 
1993). Following the economic theory and in the case of the classical oligopoly game, 
the player who sets the lowest price gains the entire market (Cayseele and Furth, 
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1996). In the dynamic duopoly case one player gains what the other looses (Sorger, 
1995; Howroyd and Russell, 1984).    
The Cournot duopoly model is probably the first case of bounded rationality in the 
economics literature, which defines the Cournot-Nash strategy in the space of 
quantities (Szidarovszky and Yen, 1995). However it relies on the strict assumption 
that firms are able to observe both the quantity produced and sold by their rivals.  
There are attempts in modeling the lack of exact knowledge by duopolists (Kirman, 
1975). Gates et al. (1982) consider also linear demand functions for differentiated 
products assuming a learning process. 
Naimzada and Sbragia (2005) using the gradient dynamics adjustment process 
adjust the firms’ production in the direction indicated by their (correct) estimate of the 
marginal profit. Leonard and Nishimura (1999) employ an arbitrary non linear 
demand without full information. Firms in a Cournot model do not observe their 
rival’s actions, making mistaken beliefs. The above assumptions destroy the stability 
of equilibrium and create cycles, so the dynamics of the Cournot model are also 
affected.  
A different approach, given by Bylka et al. (2000), studies the situation where 
oligopolistic firms compete with a global demand constraint. The evolution of firms’ 
market demand is determined by all firms’ price decisions. Their interests focus into 
analysis of some simple classes of strategies and to find the best responses to them. 
To that end, Huck et al. (2002) report results of the Cournot best reply process. In a 
Cournot oligopoly with four firms, linear demand and linear cost functions, the best 
reply process explodes. They also investigate the power of several learning dynamics 
to explain the unpredicted stability. 
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The game theory aspects that have been explored rely on the existence of open-
loop and Markov Perfect Nash Equilibrium (MPNE) (Fershtman and Muller, 1984; 
Amir, 1989; Sundaram, 1989; Dockner and Sorger, 1996) as well as the equilibrium 
stability paths in the case of complex dynamic behavior (Dockner et al., 1996; Mitra 
and Roy, 2007; Zhang, 2007). On the other hand, Fudenberg and Tirole (1983) and 
Reynolds (1991) study Nash equilibria in the case when players use closed-loop 
(Markovian) strategies. Fudenberg and Tirole examine Markov strategies when 
players maximize the time average payoff. Reynolds assumes a symmetric linear-
quadratic differential game but his game is a standard one in continuous-time games 
solved using dynamic programming methods. 
Applications of the Markov concept can be found on resource extraction (Dutta 
and Sundaran, 1988; Levhari and Mirman, 1980; Sundaran, 1989), on dynamic 
monopoly or oligopoly (Benadou 1989; Eaton and Engers, 1990; Harris, 1988; 
Kirman and Sobel, 1974; Maskin and Tirole, 1987, 1988a,b), on bequest equilibria 
(Bernheim and Ray, 1989; Harris, 1985) and on research and development (Harris and 
Vickers 1987). 
Another model of pollution found in literature that follows the original Tsutsui 
and Mino (1990) paper with respect to extracted strategies is by Fujiwara and 
Matsueda (2007). In their note they report the property of a nonlinear feedback Nash 
strategy equilibrium in the linear quadratic dynamic game. In their dynamic model of 
pollution, with a linear demand function, no state variables enter the objective 
functionals of the players, which are two polluting firms. But with this deviation, the 
lack of the state variables into payoffs, one would expect static and dynamic 
equilibrium coincidence. However, they demonstrate that the above conjecture is not 
true if a nonlinear feedback strategy is employed. Their results indicate broader 
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applicability of the novel finding of Tsutsui and Mino (1990), i.e. certain feedback 
strategy equilibrium approximates the monopoly outcome, provided that the discount 
rate is sufficiently small. 
Our model differs ultimately from Fujiwara and Matsueda’s note. One basic 
difference is the demand function, which is a nonlinear one. Another difference is the 
value function of the firm’s discounted revenues that is computed and its implications 
on firm’s output and pollution stock. The only similarity to that model it seems to be 
the fact that no state variable enters into the players’ objective function. To that end 
the basic difference is not only the statement of the problem approach but the main 
result as well. 
In the field of pollution regulation Haucap and Kirstein (2003) compare the 
incentive effects of pollution taxes versus pollution permits for a budget oriented 
government. Pollution permits are analyzed as durable goods, while pollution tax is 
seen as being equivalent to leasing out pollution permits. Implicitly they ask what 
policy instruments different types of government would prefer and, given the 
government incentives, how environmental policy should be designated from a 
welfare perspective. They start from the idea that pollution taxes can be seen as a 
leasing solution to preserve a monopoly power of a revenue maximizing government.  
In their two period model they analyze the efficiency characteristics of durable 
pollution permits versus taxes and identify circumstances under which either policy 
instrument is preferable from an efficient point of view, given policymaker’s 
incentives. One major conclusion extracted from the paper is the fact that 
environmental policy based on durable pollution permits can yet be welfare superior 
to a pollution tax. This is caused by the credibility problem that weakens the 
government ability to commit to the monopoly quantity in the long run. 
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In the same field of pollutants regulation Wirl (1996) explores the hypothesis that 
the politicians have, in contrast to the normative literature, an interest in tax revenues. 
Wirl conjectures that the Leviathan motive will raise taxes and this will mitigate the 
tragedy of commons, despite the ignorance of international spillovers by national 
government. The political message extracted form Wirl’s paper, in the topic of global 
warming, is a warning to “Greens” that appealing to the Leviathan motives of 
governments may ease the introduction of carbon taxes but may ultimately harm the 
environment. 
Here in our proposed model we make use of the dynamic modeling because is the 
more general modern perspective that extracts several results depending on the 
informational structure employed by the game. For this reason we study the stronger 
with respect to time consistency version, that is the closed loop or Markovian type of 
equilibrium (while the weaker is open loop), and extract the associated conclusions. 
We could infer that the choice between using open or closed loop strategies is a 
matter of analytical feasibility and tractability but not only economic justification. At 
the same time and in our case we use differential games but we maximize discounted 
revenues. 
3. The basic model 
Let us assume that there are N  firms in an oligopoly market. Firm i  accumulates 
a stock of pollution ( )iP t  at time t , with ( ) 00i iP P= . Let ( )P t  denote the sum of all 
pollutants at time t , that is             ( ) ( )
1
N
i
i
P t P t
=
= ∑  
We define ( ) ( ) ( )i iP t P t P t− = − . We assume that the rate of change of firm’s i  
pollution stock is                               ( ) ( )i iP t q t=&  
where ( )iq t  is firm’s i  output at time t . The inverse demand function is  given by  
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                                       ( )( ) ( )( ) 1aD q t q t ⎛ ⎞−⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠=  
where ( )0,α ∈ +∞  and ( ) ( )
1
N
i
i
q t q t
=
= ∑  is the total quantity. 
The negative parameter 1
a
⎛ ⎞−⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  determines, in absolute value, the elasticity of 
demand, i.e. the inverse demand function is elastic if ( )0,1a∈ , inelastic if ( )1,a∈ +∞  
and takes the hyperbolic shape if 1a = , but is always convex as figure 1 shows.  
Figure 1: Industry’s demand                     
 
                                                                         
   
                  (a) (α=10)                                                    (b)  (α=0.8) 
 
                                                
                                                                            
 
 
                  (c) (α=3)                                                            (d) (α=1)   
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Here in order to form the dynamic problem we neglect the production costs, so 
firms in industry are rather revenues maximizers, an approach that is not usual in 
practice, since no state variable enters into the objective functional, but still 
compatible with the differential game literature. Having these assumptions the 
dynamic can be presented as follows.  Firm’s i  revenues are given by the expression: 
                                     ( ) ( ) 1, ai i i i i iR q q q q q ⎛ ⎞−⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠− −= +         
where                                     i iq q q− = −  
The objective function of firm i  is to maximize the present value of the stream of 
cash flow subject to the system dynamics, that is the problem 
                                        ( ) 1
0
max rtai i iq q q e dt
∞ ⎛ ⎞−⎜ ⎟ −⎝ ⎠−+∫                          ( )1  
subject to                               ( ) ( )i iP t q t=&                                              ( )1a  
with                                          ( ) 00i iP P=         
The choice variable of firm i  is its quantity iq , while the state variable is its 
accumulated pollution stock iP . 
We seek to find a strategy and the value function of the dynamic problem under 
the Closed Loop11 or Markovian Nash informational structure equilibrium which is by 
definition the concept of equilibrium in which the choice of player’s i  current action 
is conditioned on current time t  and on state vector too.  
Under the closed–loop informational structure and stationarity of the game the 
player’s i  strategy space is this of mappings 
                                               : niφ + →     
                                                 
1  For more details about the informational structures of the dynamics games, see Olsder and   
Basar (1998). 
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which associates to a vector of pollution stock ( )1 2, ,..., nNP P P +∈    the quantity 
( )1 2, ,...,i NP P Pφ  to produce. Each player i  of the game has to choose a quantity 
( )iq t ∈   of good to produce. The price of that good is then set according to  
                                       ( )
1
1 2
1
, ,...,
N a
N i
i
D q q q q
⎛ ⎞−⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
=
⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑  
The payment (total revenues) of the firm i  is the given by 
               ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )1 2 1 2
0
: , ,..., , ,..., ,..., ti N i NU D P P P P e dt
ρφ φ φ φ φ φ φ
∞
−→ ∫  
where ( ) 1,...,k k NP =  evolve according to the differential equation determined by ( )1a . 
An equilibrium should then be defined as a set of strategies for which no player has a 
profitable deviation. 
Imposing this assumption on informational structure of the game, clearly the 
history of the game is important and is reflected in the current value of the state 
vector. Consequently, player’s i  optimal time paths take into account at any point of 
time the control variables of the other players. This type of equilibrium affects the 
state variables, requiring a revision of the player’s i  controls at any time instant. Here 
we apply the Hamilton – Jacobi – Bellman (HJB) equation in order to prove that the 
conjectured strategy we propose is a Markovian strategy and consequently a strong 
time consistent one. In contrast to the open loop informational structure the closed 
loop is a strongly time consistent one, but the open loop is not. Here the time 
consistent property is in the sense of sub–game perfectness (for more details see 
Dockner et al. 2000). 
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4. Markov Perfect Nash Equilibrium (MPNE) 
We denote by iφ  the strategy that specifies firm’s i  production rate as a function 
of time t  and the vector of pollution stocks accumulated at the same time. This is the 
strategy                     ( ) ( )( )i iq t P tφ=  
Each firm takes competitors strategies as given and determines its optimal strategy 
that solves problem ( )1  with constraint ( )1a . 
 
Proposition 1. 
A MPNE exists, where the equilibrium strategy of firm i  has the property that its 
output level depends only on its pollution stock. That is  
                                              i iq arP=                    1,...,i N=  
The discounted sum of firm’s i  revenues ( )iV P , when the total pollution is P , are 
given by                               ( ) ( )
1
1
1
N a
a
i i k
k
V P ar P P
⎛ ⎞−⎜ ⎟⎛ ⎞ ⎝ ⎠−⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
=
⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑                  ( )2  
 
Proof (See appendix) 
 
A special case 
Consider for a moment that elasticity of demand equals to one, 1a = . As it is 
simply clear in this case the market demand function collapses to a hyperbolic shape, 
this being a special case of a more general class of models based on isoelastic demand 
curves. It is well known from the literature2 in such a case the maximum problem of a 
firm choosing the output level is indeterminate if marginal cost is zero, since the 
                                                 
2  For an exposition of a differential oligopoly model where firms face implicit menu costs of 
adjusting output over time due to sticky market price, see Lambertini (2007). 
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revenues generated by a hyperbolic demand are constant, thus economically 
unacceptable. But even in this special case our model under closed loop informational 
structure yields economically acceptable strategies and value function as well. More 
precise setting demand elasticity to one, 1a = , the model solution yields the following 
results for strategies and value function respectively: 
                                  i iq rP=                     1,...,i N=                 ( )3  
                             ( ) ( )( )
( )1
1
1
N
i i k
k
V P r P P
−
−
=
⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑                ( )4  
 The latter reasoning leads us to conclude the following corollary. 
 
Corollary 1 
The above proposed model of pollution even in the case of hyperbolic demand, so for 
constant revenues, yields economically acceptable strategies and value functions 
given by ( )3 , ( )4  respectively. 
 
5. Policies in the allowed pollution stock  
We consider now the impact of a small change in the allowed pollution stock 
imposed by an authority into the firms’ value function. For this purpose we 
investigate the total differentiation of the value function  
      ( ) ( )
1
1
1
N a
a
i i k
k
V P ar P P
⎛ ⎞−⎜ ⎟⎛ ⎞ ⎝ ⎠−⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
=
⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑   
with respect to pollution, that is  
                               
, 1
N
i i
i i j
j i ji j
V VdV dP dP
P P≠ =
∂ ∂= +∂ ∂∑           ( )5  
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In order to have a unified result into the previous found value function of each firm 
we record the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 2. 
A marginal increase in the total pollution stock, affects incrementally the discounted 
firm’s i  revenues, if the inequality 1 i iP dP
a P dP
>  holds, otherwise an increase in the 
total pollution stock reduces the discounted sum of firm’s i  revenues. 
Proof (See Appendix) 
 
The total derivative of the value function after manipulations (see in the appendix) 
is given by the expression  
                      ( ) 1 i iai P dPdV arP dP aP dP
⎛ ⎞−⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎡ ⎤= −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦                    ( )6  
Since the term ( ) 1aarP ⎛ ⎞−⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  of  ( )6  always measures the aggregate demand, as 
( )
1
1
1 1
N N a
a
i i
i i
q q ar P arP
⎛ ⎞−⎜ ⎟ ⎛ ⎞⎝ ⎠ −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
= =
⎛ ⎞= = =⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑ ∑  and we have set 1
N
i
i
P P
=
=∑ , the rest of term ( )6  
i iP dPdP
aP dP
⎡ ⎤−⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦  measures the amount multiplied with the total demand, giving the total 
marginal change on the discounted revenues.  
Furthermore, we assume that the sign of ( )6  is negative and results in a 
decrement of the discounted revenues, that is, 1 i iP dP
a P dP
<   and firms are ranked by an 
increasing order of the allowed pollution stock 1 2 1... ...i i NP P P P P+< < < < < , so the 
initial pollution shares are 1i iP P
P P
+< . We have                          
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1
1
i i
i i
P PdP dPdP dP
a P a P
+
+< <   
Subtracting the LHS and RHS of the two relations we have 
             ( )1 1i i i idP P P dP dPaP + +− < −                       ( )7  
The LHS of  ( )7  is a negative number. So we have  1i idP dP+>  ( )i∀ . Following  ( )7  
we conclude the following corollary. 
 
Corollary 2 
In the case of a decrement in the discounted revenues caused by a marginal increment 
of the total allowed pollution stock, dP , the order of marginal increments of 
individual firms, idP , is ranked by the reverse order rather than the originally allowed 
set of pollution stocks. That is, if 1 2 ... NP P P< < <  the result in the above marginal 
decrease is 1 2 ... NdP dP dP> > >  
 
The impact of an absolute increase to the pollution stocks  idX ε=  ( )i∀  can be 
expressed as follows. 
 
Corollary 3 
A uniform absolute increase in all pollution stocks by 0idP ε= > reduces firm’s i  
discounted revenues if and only if iP a
P N
< . 
Proof 
The result is easily obtained since  
1
1N i
i
i
dPdP dP N
dP N
ε
=
= = ⇒ =∑  and i iP dPaP dP< . 
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Next we consider a new allocation of the allowed pollution stocks. With OiP  we 
denote firm’s i  old allowed pollution and with NiP  the reallocated (new) allowed 
pollution stock. Moreover we assume that the new allowed pollution is less than the 
original, ( )1,..,O Ni iP P i N> = . 
The next proposition joints the two pollution stocks assuming the last given order.  
 
Proposition 3. 
The discounted revenues of each firm increases while the total pollution stock falls, 
caused by a new allocation, if and only if ( ) 11 1aiσ σ ⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠> − + , where 
  1
1
1
N
N
k
k
N
O
k
k
P
P
σ =
=
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠= − ⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
∑
∑
 and 1
N
i
i O
i
P
P
σ = − . 
 
Proof (See Appendix) 
 
Remark 
The results of Proposition 3 may be used as follows. Suppose that an authority 
decides to decrease the total pollution by an amount P∆  (
1
N
i
i
P
P
σ
=
∆=
∑
), so in order to 
have each firm higher revenues, its allowed pollution stock must be reduced by the 
amount  ( ) 11 1O N Oai i i iP P P Pσ ⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎛ ⎞− = ∆ = − +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ . 
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In the same way we consider a uniform decrease η  to all firms’ pollution. Then
                             1
1 1
1
N
O
i
i
N N
O O
i i
i i
N P
N
P P
η ησ =
= =
+
= − =
∑
∑ ∑
 
and the raised revenues requirement is       ( ) 11 1 aiσ σ ⎛ ⎞−⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠> − −  
and finally                                    ( ) 1
1
1 1 aiN
O
i
i
N
P
η σ ⎛ ⎞−⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
=
> − −
∑
  
where 
1
N
O O
i
i
P P
=
=∑  is the initial allocation of the pollution and 1 Nii O
i
P
P
σ = −  the 
percentage change on firm’s i  allowed pollution stock. 
 
6. Concluding remarks 
In this paper we set up a very simple model of polluting oligopolists where the 
demand is not linear and the resulting game is not a linear quadratic one. We also 
make the assumptions that each firm is allowed to pollute to a variable size depending 
on the criterion that is given by an authority. The results, in our opinion, are useful for 
an authority to make distributed pollution policies on the industry in total as well as 
partially on a firm.   
One conclusion that could be drawn as a result of the above model is that a new 
technology that reduces the total amount of the accumulated pollution stock is not 
necessarily welcomed by all firms in the industry. If for example any authority 
decides to improve the technology that is used by firms previous analysis shows that 
the bigger, with respect to the pollution stock, firm does not always benefit from this 
decision. 
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Specifically, our results on a strong time consistent (Markov) equilibrium with 
conjectured value function and strategies are surprising. Although without exposing 
the solutions of the problem in full generality, as Tsutsui and Mino (1990) face their 
linear quadratic differential game in a duopoly with sticky prices, a strong time 
consistent solution is obtained using the conjectured method.   
Moreover testing the above strategies and value function obtained we are able to 
conclude many policy results. As the pollution is accumulated by product in an 
industry we expect for each firm the higher the production process is the more the 
pollution stock will be. However, the findings of the model are slightly different. It is 
possible a marginal decrease on the total pollution stock to increase the firms’ 
discounted revenues, provided that the original allowed pollution share multiplied by 
the elasticity of demand is greater than the marginal change share.  
Additionally, a reallocation caused by a uniform decrease into all firms pollution, 
reorders the marginal change of the pollution stocks in reverse to the original order of 
the allowed pollutions and again the reallocation is possible to raise the discounted 
revenues of each firm.  
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Appendix  
Proofs of Propositions 
 
Proof of Proposition 1 
First we check that if firm’s j  strategy is j jq arP= , then firms’ i  best response will 
be i iq arP= . The Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (hereafter HJB) equation for firm’s i  
maximization problem  is the following 
                    ( ) ( )1
, 1
N
i ia
i i i i i j
j i ji j
V VrV q q arP q arP
P P
⎛ ⎞−⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠−
≠ =
∂ ∂= + + +∂ ∂∑  
Maximization of the RHS of the HJB equation with respect to iq  gives  
                    ( ) ( )( )
1
1
0
a
i i i ia
i i
i i i
q q arP Vq arP
a q arP P
⎛ ⎞−⎜ ⎟⎛ ⎞ ⎝ ⎠− −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠−
−
+ ∂+ − + =+ ∂  
or equivalently 
                   ( ) ( )
1
1i iai i
i i i
V qq arP
P a q arP
⎛ ⎞−⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠−
−
⎡ ⎤∂ = + −⎢ ⎥∂ +⎣ ⎦
      ( ).1A  
Where iP−  represents the sum of all pollution stocks except firm’s i  pollution stock, 
that is  i iP P P− = −  and 
1
N
j
j
P P
=
= ∑  
Now we make use of  the nonlinear conjectured value function  
                                ( )
1
1
1
N a
a
i i j
j
V ar P P
⎛ ⎞−⎜ ⎟⎛ ⎞ ⎝ ⎠−⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
=
⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑  
Differentiation of the value function with respect to iP  yields 
                 ( ) ( ) ( )
1
1 1
1
a
ii ia a
i
arP PV ParP arP
P aP aP
⎛ ⎞−⎜ ⎟⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎝ ⎠− −⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠∂ ⎛ ⎞= − + = −⎜ ⎟∂ ⎝ ⎠          ( ).2A  
with 
1
N
j
j
P P
=
= ∑  the same as above. 
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Equating the terms with the same power of  ( ).1A  and ( ).2A  we have the 
resulting equations 
                                  ( )1 1i ii i
P q
aP a q arP−
− = −+                ( ).3A  
and                                      ( ) ( )1 11a aiarP q arP⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞− −⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠−= +                   ( ).4A  
Both equations ( ).3A   and ( ).4A  have the same solution  
                                             i iq arP= . 
Now we prove that substituting the above strategies into the RHS of the HJB function 
we have equality with the LHS of the same equation. The partial derivative of the 
value function iV  with respect to jP  is 
                                   ( )
11
aa
ii
j
ar PPV
P aP
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞ −⎜ ⎟−⎜ ⎟ ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠∂ =∂             ( ).5A  
so the RHS of the HJB is 
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
1 1
11
, 1
( ) 1ia ai i i i
i i
aN a
i
j
j i j
arPRHS HJB arP arP arP arP arP
a arP arP
ar PP
arP
aP
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞− −⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠−
−
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞ −⎜ ⎟−⎜ ⎟ ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
≠ =
⎛ ⎞= + + − +⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟+⎝ ⎠
+ =∑
 
= ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 1 1 1. i ia a a ai i i iP ParP arP arP arP arP arP arP arPP P
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞− − − −⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ −⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠− + − =  
( ) ( )1 1i ia ai iP PrP arP r arP PP
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞− −⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠+= = ( ) ( )irV P LHS HJB= =  
Where as above we have set            
1
N
j
j
P P
=
= ∑  
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Proof of Proposition 2 
The total derivative of the value function is  
                          
, 1
N
i i
i i j
j i ji j
V VdV dP dP
P P≠ =
∂ ∂= +∂ ∂∑             ( ).6A  
Substituting the partial derivatives ( ).2A  and ( ).5A  previously found, into ( ).6A  the 
derivative of the value function takes the form: 
               ( ) ( )
11
1
, 1
1
aN a
iia
i i j
j i j
ar PPPdV arP dP dP
aP aP
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞ −⎜ ⎟−⎜ ⎟ ⎝ ⎠⎛ ⎞ ⎝ ⎠−⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
≠ =
⎛ ⎞= − +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ∑  
Putting the term ( ) 1 ia iParP dPaP
⎛ ⎞−⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠   inside the sum, the above expression simplifies to 
                  ( ) ( ) ( )
11
1
1
1
aN a
ia
i i j
j
ar PP
dV arP dP dP
aP
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞ −⎜ ⎟−⎜ ⎟ ⎝ ⎠⎛ ⎞ ⎝ ⎠−⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
=
= − +∑  
Multiplying  and divide the first term the RHS of the latter by ( )
11
1
aN a
i
j
j
ar PP
dP
aP
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞ −⎜ ⎟−⎜ ⎟ ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
=
∑  
we have               ( ) 1
1
1
N
i ia
i j N
j
j
j
P dPdV arP dP
aP dP
⎛ ⎞−⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
=
=
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟= −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
∑ ∑
 
Setting 
1
N
j
j
dP dP
=
⎛ ⎞≡ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑  the latter simplifies to 
                           ( ) 1 i iai P dPdV arP dP aP dP
⎛ ⎞−⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎡ ⎤= −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦              ( ).7A  
The meaning of  ( ).7A  is, as we expect that a change in the allowed pollution stocks 
results in the same sign change on firm’s i  discounted revenues depending on the 
sign of the term inside the brackets. That is, if the sign of the bracketed term is 
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positive an increase in the total pollution stock dP  increases the discounted revenues 
of firm’s i , as the term outside brackets reveals and vice versa.  
Now consider the term of ( ).7A  i iP dP
aP dP
⎛ ⎞−⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ , which shows how the change on 
firm’s i  revenues responds to a marginal change in the pollution stock. The term 
under consideration has positive sign which means that   
1 i iP dP
a P dP
>      ( ).8A   
i.e. the original allowed pollution share multiplied by the elasticity is greater than the 
marginal change share. 
 
 
Proof of Proposition 3 
From solution of the original value function we have the two value functions of the 
discounted revenues 
                             ( ) ( )
1
1
1
N a
O O Oa
i i k
k
V P ar P P
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=
⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑             ( ).10A  
Subtracting ( ).9A  from ( ).10A  to have incremental revenues, the positive change in 
firm’s i  revenues due to reallocation is 
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The latter expression simplifies denoting by 1
1
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k
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=
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∑
∑
the percentage 
decrement into the total pollution and with 1
N
i
i O
i
P
P
σ = −  the percentage change into 
firm’s i  pollution. In order to have an increment into firms’ i  discounted revenues it 
suffices to hold the condition   
 ( ) 1 11
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σ σ
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